TIMOTHY S. BLACK, District Judge.
The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendations of United States Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman (Doc. # 16), to whom this case was referred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and noting that no objections have been filed thereto and that the time for filing such objections under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) has expired, and for good cause shown upon the Court's de novo review, hereby ADOPTS said Report and Recommendations.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED with prejudice. Defendant is also DENIED a certificate of appealability. This Court further certifies to the Court of Appeals that any appeal would be objectively frivolous.
MICHAEL J. NEWMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner Samuel Snyder brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He was convicted of four counts of rape in the Clark County Court of Common Pleas and is serving twenty-four years imprisonment in Respondent's custody. Proceeding pro se, Snyder pleads three grounds for relief:
(Pet., Doc. 1, PAGEID 6-9.)
On October 8, 1999, Snyder was indicted by the Clark County grand jury on fifteen counts of various sex offenses involving
Following sentencing, Snyder timely filed a Notice of Appeal on May 9, 2000, raising one assignment of error:
(Appellant's Br., Doc. 8-5, PAGEID 88.) The Court of Appeals affirmed Snyder's conviction and sentence on December 14, 2001. State v. Snyder, C.A. No. 00CA33, 2001-Ohio-7003, 2001 WL 1598022 (Ohio Ct.App.2d Dist. Dec. 14, 2001). (Doc. 8-7.) Snyder did not appeal the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court.
While his direct appeal was pending, Snyder filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court. (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief, Doc. 8-8.) On May 11, 2001, the state court denied Snyder's petition without conducting a hearing. State v. Snyder, No. 99-CR-0544 (Clark Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. May 11, 2011). (Doc. 8-10.)
Snyder then timely appealed the trial court's failure to grant him a hearing on his post-conviction relief petition. Over the next seven years, his post-conviction appeal moved back and forth between the appellate and trial courts.
(Appellant's Br., Doc. 8-27, PAGEID 240, 244; Appellant's Supplemental Br., Doc. 8-29, PAGEID 262.) Reviewing Snyder's claims on the merits, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. State v. Snyder, No. 07-CA-69, 2008 WL 2469205 (Ohio Ct.App.2d Dist. June 20, 2008). (Doc. 8-35.) Snyder then timely appealed the denial of his post-conviction petition to the Ohio Supreme Court, but it declined to hear the case. State v. Snyder, No. 2008-1444, 895 N.E.2d 567 (Ohio Oct. 29, 2008). (Doc. 8-39.)
Additionally, on November 30, 2007, Snyder filed an untimely application to re-open his appeal, under Ohio App. R. 26(B), to assert an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim based on his counsel's failure to amend his appellate brief to raise an Apprendi issue. (Appl., Doc. 8-18.) On March 31, 2008, the Court of Appeals denied his application, determining that he failed to show good cause for his delay, and alternatively, that his argument was meritless. State v. Snyder, C.A. Case No. 03CA0067 (Ohio Ct.App.2d Dist. Mar. 31, 2008). (Doc. 8-21.) Snyder appealed, but the Ohio Supreme Court declined to hear his claims. State v. Snyder, No. 2008-0913, 891 N.E.2d 772 (Ohio Aug. 6, 2008). (Doc. 8-25.)
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), when a state court decides a federal constitutional claim on the merits, the federal habeas court must defer to the state court decision unless: (1) the state courts' decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court"; or (2) the state court's decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is considered "contrary to ... clearly established Federal law," when it is "diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed." Nields v. Bradshaw, 482 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir.2007). To be deemed "an unreasonable application of... clearly established Federal law," a state court's decision must be "objectively unreasonable," not simply erroneous or incorrect. Cornwell v. Bradshaw, 559 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir.2009) (citations omitted). Further, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), a state court's factual findings are presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts them by clear and convincing evidence. Id. This statutory presumption of correctness also extends to factual findings made by state appellate courts' review of trial court records. Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 614 (6th Cir.2003).
In Ground One, Snyder claims that his plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently because he was heavily medicated during the plea negotiations. Respondent argues that Snyder's claim is procedurally barred because: (1) he failed to raise the issue on direct appeal; and (2) he did not directly appeal his conviction to the Ohio Supreme Court. (Return of Writ, Doc. 8, PAGEID 49-53.)
The Sixth Circuit requires a habeas court to apply a three-part test, established in Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986), to determine whether a claim is precluded by procedural default:
Eley v. Bagley, 604 F.3d 958, 964-65 (6th Cir.2010) (citation omitted). To overcome procedural default, a petitioner must demonstrate "that there was `cause' for him to not follow the procedural rule and that he was actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error." Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138.
Here, Snyder's first ground of relief is not procedurally barred. Given that his claim was premised on facts outside the record, i.e., that he intentionally overdosed on his medications in jail before the plea colloquy, it could not have been completely addressed on direct appeal. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621-22, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). Further, even if Snyder should have challenged the validity of his guilty plea on direct appeal, his claim is still not procedurally barred because the Court of Appeals did not enforce the procedural rule and adjudicated the claim on the merits on post-conviction review. Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 432-33 (6th Cir.2007). Accordingly, the Court will review the merits of Snyder's first claim for relief.
Here, the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court's factual findings regarding Synder's claim that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently:
State v. Snyder, No. 07-CA-69, 2008 WL 2469205 (Ohio Ct.App.2d Dist. June 20, 2008). (Doc. 8-35, PAGEID 303-04) (brackets added).
Not only should reviewing courts, as a general rule, defer to a trial court's credibility determinations, Peveler v. United States, 269 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir.2001), AEDPA mandates that a habeas court presume a state court's factual findings are correct. Clark v. O'Dea, 257 F.3d 498, 506 (6th Cir.2001). Thus, without clear and convincing evidence that the trial court's findings of fact were erroneous, the Court must accept the state court's factual findings.
It is well established that a guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). While a court should review the particular circumstances of each case, a state court's decision — that a guilty plea was proper — is presumed to be correct, unless the transcript of the plea proceeding does not adequately demonstrate that it was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 324, 326-27 (6th Cir.1993).
Based on the plea transcript and the trial court's factual findings, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that Snyder's guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent:
State v. Snyder, No. 07-CA-69, 2008 WL 2469205 (Ohio Ct.App.2d Dist. June 20, 2008). (Doc. 8-35, PAGEID 304-05.)
Having reviewed the plea colloquy, the Court finds that Snyder's guilty plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. During the plea colloquy, Snyder explicitly denied that he was under the influence of any medication. (Plea Transcript, Doc. 8-40, PAGEID 335.) In addition, Snyder testified that he had discussed the case with his attorney and understood the document setting out the terms of his guilty plea. (Id. at PAGEID 336.) Moreover, at the end of the plea colloquy, the trial judge concluded that Snyder's guilty plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. (Id. at PAGEID 346.) As Snyder has failed to rebut the presumption that his plea was proper by clear and convincing evidence, the state's finding is entitled to deference. See Stewart v. Morgan, 232 Fed.Appx. 482, 490-91 (6th Cir.2007) (concluding that the defendant's "self-serving, after-the-fact testimony that he used marijuana before entering his plea" did not constitute clear and convincing evidence to rebut the trial court's finding that his guilty plea was valid).
Therefore, it was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent for the Court of Appeals to conclude that Snyder's guilty plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. As Snyder has not presented any evidence to overturn the state court's factual findings, Ground One should be dismissed.
Ground Two is closely related to Ground One. Snyder claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty while he was heavily medicated. Although the State contends that this claim is procedurally barred, as discussed above, this argument fails because the Court of Appeals adjudicated the claim on the merits on post-conviction review. See Durr, 487 F.3d at 432-33. Thus, the Court will review the Court of Appeals' decision.
In denying Snyder's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court of Appeals reasoned:
State v. Snyder, No. 07-CA-69, 2008 WL 2469205 (Ohio Ct.App.2d Dist. June 20, 2008). (Doc. 8-35, PAGEID 305.)
To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Snyder must meet the two-part Strickland v. Washington test by demonstrating that his counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Because there is "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance," to meet the "deficiency" prong, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688-90, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To satisfy the "prejudice" prong in the context of guilty pleas, "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty or no contest and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). If the Court finds that one prong is not satisfied, then it need not analyze the second prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Although the Court of Appeals did not cite Strickland v. Washington, its decision is still entitled to deference as long as the result is consistent with the Strickland standard. Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). Here, the Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that Snyder's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was without merit under Strickland. It determined that, given the lack of credible evidence that Snyder was heavily medicated during the plea hearing, there was likewise no support for Snyder's claim that his counsel was deficient for allowing him to plead guilty. Further, Snyder did not present any evidence that his counsel was aware, or should have been aware, of the fact that he allegedly overdosed on medication. Moreover, there is no indication in the plea hearing transcript that Snyder's behavior exhibited that he was heavily medicated. In contrast, Snyder represented to the court that he was not influenced by any medication, and that he was satisfied with his counsel's representation. (Plea Transcript, Doc. 8-40, PAGE ID 335-36.)
Therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, Snyder is not entitled to habeas relief based on his claim alleged in Ground Two.
In Ground Three, Snyder asserts that his sentence, requiring him to serve each count consecutively, is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). Despite the State's contentions, Snyder's claim is not procedurally defaulted because Snyder properly raised this claim in his post-conviction petition and the Court of Appeals addressed the claim on the merits. See Durr, 487 F.3d at 432-33. Thus, the Court will review the Court of Appeals' decision on the merits.
The Ohio Court of Appeals held:
State v. Snyder, No. 07-CA-69, 2008 WL 2469205 (Ohio Ct.App.2d Dist. June 20, 2008). (Doc. 8-35, PAGEID 306.) While the Court of Appeals correctly noted that the holding in State v. Foster does not apply to Snyder's sentence because his case was not pending on direct appeal when Foster was issued, 845 N.E.2d at 499, the question for the Court is whether Snyder's sentence violates clearly established federal law.
Here, Snyder's claim fails because it was not unconstitutional for the trial judge to impose consecutive sentences on Snyder. Recently, the Supreme Court held that the continued use of consecutive sentences, as was customary at common law, does not violate the United States Constitution as interpreted in the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168-72, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009).
It is therefore
September 19, 2011
